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Abstract 
The mininal core of strategic decisions a firm has to make is three-fold: What to produce? At which 
scale? At what price? A full-fledged theory of oligopolistic competition should be able to embrace these 
three dimensions jointly. Starting from the Cournot-Bertrand dispute and the stream of research it gave 
birth to, this survey shows that we are far from having such a theory at our disposal today. Many papers 
cover two dimensions out of three and display insightful results but no paper satisfactorily addresses the 
complete picture. I discuss the limitations of the different approaches that have been undertaken. This 
discussion sets a clear agenda for further theoretical research on the oligopoly front. 
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1 Introduction
When presenting the foundations of oligopoly theory, standard textbooks
usually contrast two modes of competition: quantity competition, intiti-
ated by Cournot (1838) and price competition, put forward by Bertrand
(1883). Standard textbooks almost immediately insist that neither Cournot
nor Bertrand should be viewed as litteral descriptions but rather understood
as proxies to the actual competition where firms choose both quantities and
prices. Which of the two models best describes the nature of competition
must be a concern because if... “we want to explain market behaviour, we
should better have a good idea as to what is the appropriate model of com-
petition.”(Belleflamme and Peitz, 2010, p.66). The answer depends thus on
each industry’s peculiarities.
Starting from these premices, it is natural to question the link that may
exist between the two modes of competition. Kreps and Scheinkman (1983)
consider a duopoly stage-game with homogeneous goods where firms com-
mit to capacity levels in the first stage and compete in prices in the second
stage. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium in their game replicates the
Cournot outcomes. Hence, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) offer a convenient
shortcut to reconcile the Cournot and Bertrand approaches of oligopoly com-
petition. More and more scholars hence view Cournot as a reduced-from of
capacity-then-price competition models, in general. Nowadays, a standard
line of reasoning invokes Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) to argue that when
production capacities are difficult to adjust instantaneously, the Cournot
model is appropriate while the analysis proposed by Bertrand should be
retained in the alternative cases (Cabral (2000) is a good example in this
respect [see p. 101-114]).
The first claim of the present paper is that relying on Kreps and Scheinkman
(1983) to reconcile price and quantity competition in general terms is abu-
sive, at least for two reasons. First, in a world with homogeneous goods, the
Kreps and Scheinkman result is as famous as it is fragile: it is for instance
not robust to alternative rationing rules (Davidson and Deneckere (1986)),
it is not robust to the presence of asymmetric marginal costs (Deneckere
and Kovenock (1992)), it is not entirely robust to the presence of more than
two firms (De Francesco and Salvadori (2010)), it is not robust to sequen-
tiality of quantity commitments quantity setting (Allen et al. (2000)). It is
neither robust to a ban on consumers’ rationing. Second, the robustness of
the Kreps and Scheinkman’s result to the presence of product differentiation
is still an open question. In this paper we shall in particular highlight the
fact that a detailed analysis of price competition in the presence of product
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differentiation and capacity constraints remains to be done.
Historically, two ways out of the Bertrand paradox have been explored in
the literature in order to restore those equilibrium markups characterizing
Cournot outcomes. The first one, building on Edgeworth’s intuition, high-
lights the role of having constant marginal costs in achieving Bertrand’s
outcomes. Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) and more generally the litera-
ture dealing with capacity constrained price competition belongs to this
vein. The second one builds on Hotelling (1929)’s intuition and puts for-
ward product differentiation as a means to relax price competition. Lots of
papers have been written along each of these two directions taken separately
but the contributions that dealt with the two dimensions simultaneously can
(almost) be counted on the fingers of one hand. There is thus a huge hole
in the oligopoly theory literature: almost no equilibrium characterization
exists for the very large class of pricing games with product differentiation
and capacity constraints (or more generally, locally decreasing returns to
scale). The second claim of this paper is then that in order to reconcile
Cournot and Bertrand’s approaches to competition, we definitely have to
fill this hole.
The main aim of this paper is therefore to provide a guided tour to the
literature dealing with price competition, capacity constraints and product
differentiation. Different routes have been taken, some partial results al-
ready exist but many misunderstandings exist as well. The most frequent
confusion in this respect is the widespread belief according to which the
presence of product differentiation allows to dispense with rationing issues
because demands are well defined for all prices, and therefore that product
differentiation per se restores the existence of pure strategy equilibria in
capacity-constrained pricing games (see for instance Maggi (1996), p.242 ,
or Adler and Hanany (2009)).
The next section briefly recalls the main insights that must be retained
from the original Bertrand and Cournot models. Section 3 summarizes the
main contributions that can be derived separetely from the analysis of Edge-
worth (insisting on the role of consumers’ rationing) and Hotelling. Section
4 summarizes the main results of the capacity constrained pricing games
with product differentiation, according to whether consumers’ rationing is
allowed or not. Section 5 concludes.
3
2 From Cournot to Bertrand
Cournot builds a model where firms sell a homogeneous product and set
quantities strategically. In equilibrium, firms retain market power and this
is materialized by the fact that the market price exceeds firms’ marginal cost.
By contrast, Bertrand considers the case where two firms sell homogeneous
products but set prices strategically. In equilibrium, firms sell at marginal
cost, so that no market power is retained.
It is extremely important at this step to understand the differences be-
tween the Cournot and the Bertrand approaches. There is indeed much
more than a simple change of strategic variable when going from Cournot
to Bertrand. As nicely summarized by Daughety (1988), one actually goes
from a one-stage game to a two-stage game. To be more precise, the analysis
proposed by Cournot hangs on a Walrasian black-box mechanism that clears
the market, given the quantities set by the firms. The underlying mechanism
ensures that whatever the quantities dumped on the market, theses quan-
tities will be entirely sold at the highest possible price (determined as the
market clearing price given quantities supplied and the demand function).
Under Bertrand competition, firms set prices first, then consumers compare
prices and decide where to buy. Consumers are thus active players (though
not strategic players) under Bertrand whereas they are simply not present
under Cournot: the market demand is needed only to turn quantities into
a unique price with the help of the walrasian auctioneer. Put differently,
the market allocation process is fully explicit under Bertrand (consumers
compare prices and then “go” to the shop to buy a product they indeed get)
whereas no comparable process can be constructed under Cournot.
More precisely, it is essential for Cournot outcomes to obtain that con-
sumers are not players at all. In order to allow for a meaningful comparison
between price and quantity competition, Daughety (1988) considers two
games with firms and consumers who make their decisions simultaneously.
In both games, consumers play a mixed strategy to decide where to buy
while firms set quantities in the first game, and set prices in the second. It
is then shown that the two games, the quantity setting one and the price
setting one, display identical equilibrium outcomes, which are neither the
Cournot nor the Bertrand ones but the collusive ones!
Summing up, Bertrand and Cournot should actually not be viewed as
two variations on a common game, differing by the strategic variable re-
tained by the firms but rather as two games that differ by their timing and
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numbers of players.1 Because it allows for a much richer set of interactions
among players, the approach proposed by Bertrand may look more attrac-
tive. However the mere idea that two firms is enough to restore competitive
equilibrium outcomes very early called for critiques. The essence of the
so-called Bertrand paradox is quite simple: consumers are too powerful in
putting pressure on the firms’ decisions. Scholars therefore explored various
reasons why consumers would be less powerful and started to study the ex-
tent to which firms are likely to relax price competition through strategic
commitments.
Modern industrial organization extensively studied stage-games where
firms make strategic commitments at a pre-market competition stage, fol-
lowed by the market competition stage where price and sales are realized.
Two instruments in particular have been studied in the literature: product
differentiation and capacity commitments. These are the most direct ways
to weaken consumers’ market power. In this last respect it is then amazing
to see that, although being so strongly connected, these two lines of research
have evolved almost entirely separately one from the other: capacity-price
competition models are (almost) invariably developed in markets for homo-
geneous goods whereas product differentiation models are (almost) invari-
ably developed under a strictly constant marginal cost assumption. This
is damaging. First, from an applied economics perspective, it is desirable
to enrich basic theoretical models with product differentiation and various
forms of quantitative constraints since real world is indeed populated by
oligopolies where firms sells differentiated goods produced under (locally)
decreasing returns to scale. Second, from a theoretical point of view, we are
indeed very far from a complete theory of oligopoly competition that would
connect Cournot and Bertrand competition in more general contexts than
those explored by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983).
3 Relaxing price competition
In this section, I start by briefly summarizing the essence of Edgeworth’s
critique to Bertrand’s approach. I then expose the main features that distin-
guish the Bertrand-Edgeworth approach to capacity-constrained price com-
1In this respect, recent models with mixed Cournot-Bertrand behaviour are embarass-
ing. Tremblay (2011) for instance considers a duopoly with one firm setting quantity and
the other setting price. Relying on a Bowley (1924) type of product differentiation, it is of
course possible to put a standard market demand in the payoffs function of one firm and
the corresponding inversed one in the other’s payof function. However, it is really hard to
figure out how the market allocation works in this setting.
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petition from the Bertrand approach (where consumer rationing is forbid-
den). Finally, I summarize Hotelling’s contributions to the debate and stress
the key limitation of the approach he initiated.
3.1 Capacity constraints and the Edgeworth’s critique
In the presence of decreasing returns to scale, the case for the Bertrand
paradox becomes weaker. This has been shown very early by Edgeworth
(1897- translated in 1925) but has been largely neglected in the ensuing
literature until modern industrial organization addressed the issue along
two directions. The first one exactly follows Edgeworth and explores price
competition in models where firms face increasing marginal costs and may
decide to ration consumers whenever it is profitable for them to do so. The
extreme case is simple to figure out: if firms face rigid capacity constraints,
they simply cannot produce beyond capacities and must therefore turn some
consumers away if demand exceeds capacity. If it is possible to meet any
level of demand, but at an increasing marginal cost, firms may neverthe-
less find it more profitable to ration consumers. This line of research is
coined as Bertrand-Edgeworth competition and accommodates the presence
of rigid capacity constraints (i.e., producing beyond capacities is not fea-
sible) as well as weaker forms of quantitative constraints like increasing
marginal costs. This first approach, formalized in modern terms in Levitan
and Shubik (1972) has received considerable interest very early after Kreps
and Scheinkman’s (1983) contribution (a key author in this respect being
Dan Kovenock).
The second line of research, referred to as Bertrand competition assumes
that firms must produce to satisfy demand, i.e. that they are not allowed
to ration. For this approach to make sense, one needs that producing be-
yond capacities is indeed feasible, hence capacities must be “permeable”, or
soft. This second approach is therefore most often studied in models where
marginal cost is defined either as a smoothly increasing function or a step
function with an upward (but finite) jump at the capacity level. This ap-
proach, initiated by Dastidar (1995) only gained in popularity after Maggi
(1996) AER paper. Recent papers like Besanko et al (2010) contributed to
finally establish this modelling strategy as a standard one. 2
These two approaches are actually quite different, and, in my opinion,
the differences are largely overlooked. In the next section I build an example
2Cabon-Dhersin and Drouhin (2014) is the most recent example that follows such a
strategy.
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that highlights theses differences and explain why these two approaches are
in no case equivalent, nor even substitute one for another.
3.2 Why Bertrand differs from Bertrand-Edgeworth: an ex-
ample
Let us assume the following setup: two firms sell a homogeneous good in a
market defined by the linear demand D(p) = 1 − p. We assume that firms
share the market equally in case of a price tie. Marginal cost is constant and
equal to 0. Neglecting any form of capacity constraints, the unique Nash
equilibrium is defined by (0, 0): firms end up with zero profits and we have
the Bertrand paradox.
Suppose now that one of the two firms, say firm 1, faces an exogenous
capacity constraint at level k1 =
3
4 , i.e., installed capacity is large enough to
satisfy firm 1’s demand at the equilibrium candidate but too small to meet
aggregate demand under marginal cost pricing.
• In a Bertrand-Edgeworth model, (0, 0) is not a Nash equilibrium any-
more, even though firm 1 is clearly not capacity-constrained at the
equilibrium candidate. The marginal cost pricing equilibrium is de-
stroyed because there exists a profitable deviation for the unconstrained
firm. By raising her price, firm 2 increases demand addressed to firm
1; k1 becomes binding, so that firm 1 rations consumers; as soon as
some of these rationed consumers turn back to firm 2, this firm enjoys
a strictly positive profit; hence the deviation is profitable. Rationing
generates spillovers that induce profitable upwards deviations. It is
enough to have only one capacity-constrained firm for this mechanism
to be at work.
• By contrast, in a Bertrand model, the presence of this capacity con-
straint does not affect the original pure strategy equilibrium at all.
Under Bertrand competition, rationing is indeed forbidden. It imme-
diately follows that the kind of spillovers we have just mentioned above
are totally absent here. The fact that firm 1 is capacity constrained
does not affect at all firm 2’s strategic incentives. The only channel
through which the capacity level could affect equilibrium rests on the
cost that firm 1 has to bear when forced to meet demand beyond ca-
pacity. Suppose that selling beyond capacity involves a marginal cost
of α > 0, then when undercutting p2, firm 1 will incur a loss on sales
D(p2−)−k1 whenever p2 ≤ α. In other words, if capacity constraints
matter under Bertrand competition, it is only because they temper the
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incentives faced by the constrained firm to undercut. If only one firm
is capacity constrained, like in our example, the unconstrained firm
still has the incentive to undercut any rival’s price and we end up at
marginal cost pricing in equilibrium.
This example illustrates the mechanisms at work in the two approaches.
Under Bertrand-Edgeworth competition the capacity limitation introduces
upwards profitable deviations whereas under Bertrand competition it par-
tially reduces incentives to undercut. The unconstrained firm’s strategic
incentives are affected under Bertrand-Edgeworth whereas only the con-
strained firm’s are under Bertrand. As reminded in the next subsection,
product differentiation also weakens firms’ incentives to undercut.
3.3 Product Differentiation
Hotelling’s Stability in competition paper (1929) is rightly celebrated for be-
ing the first one to formalize a critique against Bertrand’s paradox based
on product differentiation. His Main Street metaphor puts forward a sim-
ple idea: the presence of product differentiation restores continuity in the
demands addressed to each firm. Demand continuity is then shown to re-
store stability in competition and firms end up selling above marginal cost
in equilibrium.
Hotelling’s contribution is actually twofold. First, he puts forward prod-
uct differentiation as a means to relax price competition and second, by
exploring optimal location choices by the firms, he paves the way to strate-
gic commitment games. It turns out that his minimal differentiation result
is formally flawed, as shown by d’Aspremont et al. (1979). Nevertheless,
Hotelling must be considered as the founding father of modern industrial
organization.
The original contribution of Hotelling gave birth to a very large set of
theoretical papers that contributed to improve our understanding of prod-
uct differentiation and strategic competition along numerous dimensions.
Minimal, Maximal, Intermediate differentiation principles have been estab-
lished, on the line, the circle, the triangle, the tube, the square, cube and
hypercube3... Nowadays, the quadratic transportation cost version of the
Hotelling model with extreme locations is accepted as the canonical model
for modelling oligopoly price competition model when positive equilibrium
markups are necessary for the theoretical point to be made. 4
3Popular rumor even reports of Phd students working Hotelling on a Klein bottle.
4See for instance the recent literature on two-sided markets (Armstrong (2006)).
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Notice that other models of product differentiation have been developed
in parallel to the address-model literature inspired by Hotelling. In particu-
lar, the so-called Bowley (1924) type model of differentiation has been used
reccurently in the literature. These models are based on the preferences
of a representative consumer. They are particularly well-suited to compare
Bertrand and Cournot since they easily accomodate the inversion of demand
functions. Unfortunately, they are ill-suited to study strategic commitments
in product varieties. More recently, discrete choice models of product differ-
entiation have also been extended to deal with multi-dimensional product
differentiation and probalistic choices (see Anderson et al (1992)). This
approach is particularly well-suited for empirical work. These different ap-
proaches to price competition under product differentiation have in com-
mon that they are invariably built under a strictly constant marginal cost
assumption.
There is a sense in which Hotelling (and his “address-models” followers)
as well as other models of product differentiation work too well in relaxing
price competition. To some extent, this approach almost totally obscured
the other way out of the Bertrand paradox, put forward by Edgeworth: the
presence of capacity constraints. Even though Edgeworth explicitely sug-
gests that his intuition extends to the case of differentiated products, this
remained largely unnoticed. No effort has been made to study price compe-
tition with differentiation under non constant returns to scale. As a result,
the whole literature of strategic product differentiation very much lacks ro-
bustness: strictly speaking, all available characterizations of Nash equilibria
are valid only under the assumption that marginal costs are constant.
Having summarized the main mechanisms at work when one considers
the presence of capacity limitations or product differentiation separately we
are now ready to explore the literature that mixes the two dimensions.
4 Capacity-constrained price competition and prod-
uct differentiation. A (subjective) review of the
recent advanced literature
Capacity-constrained price competition models that include product differ-
entiation typically consider stage games where firms make strategic commit-
ments in a first stage, before going to the market where prices are chosen
(market competition stage). As already mentioned, capacity-constrained
price competition may be modelled by relying on either Bertrand or Bertrand-
Edgeworth competition. As exemplified in Section 3.2 these are two very
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different modes of price competition. Moreover, in a set-up where firms
choose capacity levels and/or product attributes before price competition
takes places, we may end up with two qualitatively different classes of pric-
ing subgames: those exhibiting product differentiation and those exhibiting
homogeneous goods. These classes radically differ because the first ones be-
long to the class of games with continuous payoffs whereas the second ones
display discontinuous payoffs.
The discussion of this section is therefore organized in two subsections.
The first one covers Bertrand-Edgeworth competition and the second one
Bertrand competition. In each subsection, I discuss first the properties of
the different classes of price subgames according to whether product differ-
entiation prevails or not and second, I discuss non-price commitments made
prior to the market competition stage, i.e., at the first stage of the game.
4.1 Bertrand-Edgeworth competition
In his famous critique of Bertrand’s paradox, Edgeworth puts forward the
idea that prices are actually likely to cycle in the presence of capacity
constrained firms and that firms will secure positive profits. Interestingly
enough, he also explicitly mentions that the presence of imperfect substi-
tutes, instead of homogeneous goods, does not change the analysis qualita-
tively, i.e., cycles are robust to the presence of product differentiation but
their width is inversely related to the degree of product differentiation. To
quote Edgeworth (p.121): It will be readily understood that the extent of in-
determinateness diminished with the diminution of the degree of correlation
between the articles. Summing up, the presence of quantitative constraints
qualitatively affects price competition be it under product homogeneity or
differentiation.
4.1.1 Market competition stage
• The homogeneous good case
Let us start with the case of homogeneous products. Modern indus-
trial organization, armed with the tools of game theory, formalized Edge-
worth intuition with the help of mixed strategy equilibria. A pioneering con-
tribution on the Bertrand-Edgeworth side is Levitan and Shubik (1972)
who opens the (now famous) way from Bertrand to Cournot as finalized by
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). This literature shows for the homogeneous
good case that under Bertrand-Edgeworth competition, pure strategy equi-
libria most often fail to exist but mixed strategy ones do exist and can be
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characterized in many cases. The properties of these equilibria have been
widely studied as well as those of the associated payoffs. Very often, the
equilibrium support of price is continuous, with possibly one atom at the
upper bound. A key result regarding equilibrium payoffs is that at least one
firm, typically the larger capacity firm, is held down to its minmax payoff
(Deneckere and Kovenock (1996)).5
• The case of product differentiation
As far as product differentiation is concerned, the picture looks very
different. Within the context of Bertrand-Edgeworth competition,
very few positive results exist. Directly elaborating on Edgeworth’s intu-
ition, Benassy (1988) characterizes the domain of capacity-differentiation
levels for which the standard Bertrand-Hotelling pure strategy equilibrium
is preserved. The presence of differentiation is not sufficient to ensure per
se the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium for all levels of capacities.
Demand spillovers at work when rationing prevails are smoother in the pres-
ence of product differentiation but they are still present. They may break
demand quasi-concavity and therefore that of firms’ payoffs. The general
intuition is thus quite simple: the smaller the capacity levels the larger the
degree of differentiation it takes to preserve the existence of a pure strategy
equilibrium. This result is rephrased in a different context by Canoy (1996).
Of course, this result also implies that outside of this domain, the usual
equilibrium does not exist.
The continuity of the payoff function also introduces another (more sub-
tle) difficulty. Starting from the idea that in equilibrium firms should not
quote a price such that they are strictly rationed, it is tempting to take it as
given that in equilibrium demands addressed to the firms must equate their
installed capacities and simply invert demand functions, replacing demand
levels by installed capacity levels. The continuity of demand functions allows
indeed for well-defined inverse demand functions. The argument is sound
if one restricts attention to pure strategy equilibria and if such equilibria
exist. But of course they tend not to exist. Several authors fell into this
trap and characterize candidate equilibria that are not robust to unilateral
deviations rather than true equilibria. Examples are to be found for instance
in Encaoua et al. (1992), Bouet (2001), Lahmandi (2000).
While the non-existence issue has been widely studied, very few positive
results exist. Since the presence of product differentiation restores conti-
5Seminal contributions are Davidson and Deneckere (1986), Osborne and Pitchik
(1986), Deneckere and Kovenock (1991), Deneckere and Kovenock (1996), Allen et al.
(2000).
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nuity of the payoff functions, the existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium
is not problematic at all. The difficulty lies in the characterization of this
equilibrium, or actually, equilibria, since uniqueness is quite problematic as
well. Very few characterizations are available in the literature, and most of
them only cover asymmetric cases, i.e., cases where one firm only possibly
faces a binding capacity within the relevant range of prices.6 In a trade
context, Krishna (1989) offers an original characterization for a case where
only one firm is capacity constrained, within a limited domain of capacity
levels around the free trade equilibrium level. In equilibrium, the uncon-
strained firm mixes over two atoms while the constrained one plays a pure
strategy. Boccard and Wauthy (2006) characterize firms’ equilibrium pay-
offs and bounds the support of equilibrium prices in a Hotelling model for
the full domain of capacity. Boccard and Wauthy (2011) extend this result
to a setup where both firms are capacity constrained. They show that the
equilibrium support of prices is finite. Boccard and Wauthy (2013) con-
sider a game with asymmetric capacities and vertical differentiation. These
three papers share two main features. First, equilibrium payoffs of the two
firms tend to increase in a mixed strategy equilibrium as compared to the
corresponding unconstrained (pure strategy) price equilibrium candidate.
Second, none of these papers manages to provide an explicit characteriza-
tion of equilibrium distributions. All in all, it is thus only fair to say that
we are almost completely ignorant in this segment of the literature.7
4.1.2 Precommitments.
There are two obvious dimensions along which to endogenize the parameters
that govern price competition at the market stage: the degree of product
differentiation and the capacity levels. As already mentioned, the theoretical
literature on product differentiation commitments is immense. By contrast,
the literature on endogenous capacity choices is more limited.8 The joint
6Furth and Kovenock (1993) are an exception but they consider a sequential pricing
game, instead of a simultaneous one. Cabral et al. (1998) reports other (unpublished)
results for a simultaneous game but I did not manage to obtain a copy of their (though
available upon request) manuscript.
7This is damaging not only for the analysis of capacity constrained pricing games
of product differentiation. It turns out indeed that other classes of games display the
same features, namely princing games with uninformed buyers and pricing games with
switching costs. In these models also, upwards deviations destroy the existenc eof pure
strategy equilibria, many results have been established for the case of discontinuous games
but their extension to the class of continuous ones remains to be done.
8Important references, in addition to those already quoted are Deneckere and Kovenock
(1991), Osborne and Pitchik (1986), to name a few.
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study of capacity-differentiated commitments is a fortiori even less explored.
In view of the limitations of the Bertrand-Edgeworth literature pointed out
in the preceeding sections, we already know that very few results are to be
expected regarding optimal choices made prior to price competition.
The most obvious research question pertains to the generalization of
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) to markets with differentiated products. Put
differently: when we consider a model of product differentiation where in-
verting demand is feasible, i.e., where the Cournot equilibrium with product
differentiation can be computed, do we expect that Cournot outcomes obtain
in a subgame perfect equilibrium of the stage game where firms commit to
capacities before competing in prices? Based on the existing literature, two
results are easy to establish. First, in the domain where capacity levels are
arbitrarily small, firms actually set market clearing prices in the unique equi-
librium and are locally induced to increase their capacities. Locally, firms
tend to behave like Cournot players when capacity levels are quite small.
Second, in the domain where capacities are “large”, i.e., sufficiently above
realized demand at the unconstrained price equilibrium, firms are induced
to reduce their capacities, at least down to the level where the pure strategy
equilibrium is destroyed (a result that directly follows from Krishna (1989)).
Hence, whether from below or from above the capacity range, firms’ incen-
tives tend to push capacities at least at the frontier of the domain where
pure strategy equilibria do not exist. Since no general characterization of
mixed strategy equilibria exist, almost nothing more can be said at this step.
The full generalization of Kreps and Scheinkman being out of scope for
the moment, let us consider less ambitious setups. It turns out that the
model of quality differentiation popularized by Tirole (1988) as a mash-
up of Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) offers
a convenient vehicle for this task. Indeed under a uniform distribution of
consumers’ taste and a large degree of consumers’ heterogeneity, this model
displays the linear version of Bertrand and Cournot duopolies for the whole
domain of product differentiation. It therefore allows to study some relevant
branches of the complete capacity-differentiation-price stage game. Boccard
and Wauthy (2013) consider the case where only one firm is allowed to
limit its production capacity and shows that under efficient rationing the
unconstrained firm’s payoffs is held down to its minmax payoff whatever the
degree of product differentiation.9 When product differentiation tends to
zero, this payoff converges to the Kreps and Scheinkman payoffs of the rel-
9A result which is clearly reminiscent of Deneckere and Kovenock (1992) for the case
of homogeneous goods.
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evant subgames. Relying on the same model, Boccard and Wauthy (2013)
also partially address the related question of the endogenous level of prod-
uct differentiation under capacity limitations. Their results clearly suggests
that in a model where both capacities and qualities are endogenous, we may
expect that the homogeneous good Cournot equilibrium prevails as a sub-
game perfect equilibrium outcome. At this stage, however, this is nothing
more than a conjecture.
4.2 Bertrand competition
4.2.1 Market competition stage
• The Homogenoeus good case
The formal analysis of Bertrand competition models in the presence of
capacity constraints is more recent and dates back to Dastidar (1995) who
studies a Bertrand model with homogeneous goods where firms face strictly
convex costs. Many variations on this model have been studied that preserve
his key result: instead of having a unique zero profit pure strategy equilib-
rium, we end up with a continuum of symmetric pure strategy equilibria
where firms set identical prices and enjoy positive profits. The intuition
is straightforward: below some critical price level, undercutting the other’s
price is not profitable anymore because meeting demand levels beyond ca-
pacities is too costly. As a result, matching the other’s price becomes a best
reply. In a very recent paper, Cabon-Dhersin and Drouhin (2014) consider
a stage-game where the capacity level is chosen in the first stage so as to
ensure that the collusion is the unique payoff-dominant pure strategy Nash
equilibrium.
• The case of product differentiation
Within the context of Bertrand competition, Maggi (1996) popularized
the stepwise version of Bertrand competition in which total cost is piece-
wise linear with a kink at the level of the installed capacity. He relies on
a Bowley type of product differentiation. Notice first that when reading
Maggi’s paper, it is not entirely clear from the start which branch of the lit-
erature the model belongs to. We are indeed told that “It may be interesting
to relate this result to the well-known fact that pure-strategy equilibria (in
prices) often fail to exist in Bertrand competition games with homogeneous
goods and rigid capacity constraints (e.g., Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983).
The nonexistence problem is caused by two features of these models. One is
product homogeneity, which implies a discontinuity in the residual demand
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function. The other is that the production cost is infinite for output in ex-
cess of capacity. This implies that consumers must be rationed for certain
ranges of prices, and the demand “spillovers” from one firm to the other
may imply profit functions that are not quasi-concave. In the model pro-
posed here, neither of those features is present, since I assume differentiated
goods and firms do not have to ration consumers (since the marginal cost
of production is finite for any production level); hence, profit functions are
continuous and quasi-concave, and a unique pure-strategy equilibrium ex-
ists.”(Maggi 1996, p. 242) The ambiguity comes from Maggi’s claim that in
his model firms do not have to ration consumers. Actually, what is crucial
for the model to go through is that firms are not allowed to ration, which
is quite a different statement. In Maggi’s model indeed, firms would always
find it optimal to ration if they were allowed to do so. Thus the reason we
do not have the “non-existence problem” here is simply that we do not have
Bertrand-Edgeworth competition. Product differentiation actually plays no
role in solving the “non existence problem”. This is a consequence of the
ban on rationing, as established previously in Dastidar (1995). Product dif-
ferentiation is, however, essential in ensuring uniqueness of the pure strategy
equilibrium. Indeed, as mentioned earlier in this paper, Bertrand compe-
tition (i.e. models where rationing is forbidden) generically yields multiple
pure strategy equilibria in the case of homogeneous goods. Once properly
understood, it is hardly surprising that a combination of product differenti-
ation, “soft” capacity constraints and banning of rationing yields a unique
pure strategy price equilibrium. The ban of rationing prevents demands
spillovers (this ensures that upward deviations are not profitable) whereas
product differentiation smoothes downward deviations along well-defined
demands.
Moreover, the resulting equilibrium payoffs displays a strong Cournotian
flavour. In these models, firms must produce to satisfy demand and thus
must produce beyond capacities if required. However, “in all cases, k repre-
sents the maximum efficient scale” (Maggi (1996, p. 241)). In other words,
firms are not enclined to produce beyond installed capacity but prefer to sell
at the capacity clearing price, defined as the largest price such that demand
equals capacity, given the other’s price. Obviously, it is sufficient that the
penalty incurred when selling beyond capacity is large enough to mechanical-
lly enforce the Cournot outcomes. Besanko et al. (2010) builds on Maggi’s
model to study the dynamics of capacity accumulation and withdrawal in in-
dustries. Within their dynamic setup, relying on Bertrand competition with
product differentiation is instrumental in ensuring well-defined, and simple
to compute, equilibrium payoffs in all possible price subgames. However,
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the behaviour of their model at the no-differentiation limit is questionable
since in this case equilibrium uniqueness is lost.
4.2.2 Precommitments.
In a Bertrand competition setup, i.e. a setup where rationing is forbid-
den, Boccard and Wauthy (2010) consider a stage game where capacities and
quality levels are fully endogenized. This paper studies a three stage game
where first, quality levels are chosen, then capacity levels, and finally price
levels. The second and third stage subgames therefore cover the generalized
capacity-price competition domain of Bertrand competition. They show
that Cournot outcomes obtain in all subgames with non-degenerate product
differentiation, a result which points in the same direction as Maggi (1996).
However, they also show that in the subgame perfect equilibrium of the
full game products must be homogeneous. At the no-differentiation limit,
a continuum of equilibria exists, including the collusive one. When quality
choice is then endogenized, this collusive, homogeneous good, outcomes turn
out to be a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. In other words, under
Bertrand competition, the pseudo generalization10 of Kreps and Scheinkman
to differentiated markets does not display Cournot outcomes.
4.3 Comparison
When products are homogeneous, equilibrium outcomes in pricing subgames
differ from Bertrand-Edgeworth to Bertrand as follows: a mixed strategy
equilibrium prevails in the first case while a continum of pure strategy equi-
libria prevail in the second case.
Under product differentiation, the difference between Bertrand-Edgeworth
and Bertrand is also striking: on the one hand we have possibly multiple
mixed strategy equilibria that we cannot characterize for a large domain
of parameters and on the other hand we have a unique pure strategy equi-
librium. It seems that the presence of product differentiation acts like a
dividing line in each sub-branch of the literature:
1. In the case of Bertrand-Edgeworth competition, the division is between
what is known (properties of mixed strategy equilibria and the asso-
ciated payoffs under product’s homogeneity) and what remains to be
10We refer to pseudo generalization because rationing is forbidden; an assumption
which, as we have shown, defines a game which is entirely different from the Kreps and
Scheinkman one.
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done (a thorough analysis of mixed strategy equilibria under product
differentiation);
2. In the case of Bertrand competition, the division is between multiplic-
ity (in the case of homogeneous products) and uniqueness (in the case
of differentiated products) of pure strategy equilibria.
Moreover, the connections between the two treatments need to be clarified.
The bottom line is therefore the treatment we allot to rationing. Ideally,
one would like to let rationing result from an optimal decision of the firms,
rather than from an ad hoc assumption. Obviously, fully addressing this
question is out of reach today since we do not have a complete characteriza-
tion of equilibrium prices and payoffs in most subgames with rationing, in
particular close to the frontier between product differentiation and product
homogeneity.
To the best of my knowledge, no effort has been made to endogenize
whether to ration or not.11 Referring to the approach proposed by Maggi
where soft capacity constraints are modeled as stepwise marginal costs, we
may contemplate to endogenize the height of the step. In Boccard and
Wauthy (2010), the height of the step is assumed to be very large in order to
ensure that the penalty associated to undercutting is prohibitively large. So
that rationing consumers is optimal, if allowed. Clearly enough, if capacity
constraints are understood as a disciplining device, one may indeed think
that committing to the largest penalty in case of undercutting is a likely
outcome. But again this is a conjecture. On the other hand it is easy to
show that, given installed capacities, at least one firm will very often find it
optimal to commit to ration consumers. For instance, this is obviously the
case in the example I proposed in Section 3.2.
5 Conclusion
The minimal core strategic decisions to be made by firms as a threefold is-
sue: What to produce (product differentiation)? At which scale (choice of
capacities)? At which price (market competition)? Arguably, the first two
issues are decided before the third one. Whether the first is decided before
the second or not is debatable. What is clear however is that a really sat-
isfactory theory of oligopolistic competition should be able to address these
11Of course the Bertrand-Edgeworth literature explored the robustness of Kreps and
Scheinkman’s conclusions to the choice of rationing rule but the choice between Bertrand-
Edgeworth and Bertrand is another issue.
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three issues within a self-contained model. Our survey is quite disappointing
in this respect: we do not have such a theory at our disposal. Many authors
dealt with all possible combinations of two issues out of three ones. They
obtain very useful results. However, very few papers tried to address the
three dimensions in a unified setup and those who did ended up with rather
limited results up to now.
It turns out that even the nature of the similarities and differences be-
tween price and quantity competition are not entirely understood. Introduc-
ing capacity constraints in price competition games offers a way to connect
Cournot and Bertrand outcomes. I have argued however that lots remain to
be done in order to better understand and generalize the insights of capacity-
price competition. Bertrand competition forbids consumers’ rationing. This
proves useful in ensuring the existence of pure strategy equilibria. However,
the behaviour of the model at the no differentiation limit is problematic, at
least from a theoretical viewpoint. Moreover, it is not clear that firms would
always find it optimal to commit not to turn consumers away. On the other
hand, the behaviour of Bertrand-Edgeworth approach seems more promising
at the frontier between diffenrentiated and homogeneous goods. However,
much too little is known regarding the characterization of mixed strategy
equilibria in capacity-constrained game with product differentiation.
At this step, the research agenda is thus quite clear: it is urgent to devote
more efforts to analyze in full depth the class of Bertrand-Edgeworth pricing
games with product differentiation.
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